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bound to face uncertainty with respect to their disposable incomes. To analyse effects of 
this uncertainty, a stochastic dynamic growth model with the public sector is examined. It 
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 CORRUPTION, UNCERTAINTY AND GROWTH 
1  INTRODUCTION 
Corruption usually means a deviation from what is considered to be normal or required 
by regulations or law. In other words, corrupt public officials distort rules and 
regulations. They do it to create and capture rents for themselves.  
I argue that since corruption is illegal the outcomes of the corrupt deals are associated 
with risk. The corrupt bureaucrats may try to create a system of bribery and graft that is 
well-defined and accepted (or at least believed to be unavoidable) by the society. If it was 
possible then the burden created by such corruption would not be different from the 
public sector burden imposed by means of taxation as all agents would be aware about 
the bribes and whom and when to pay. However, corruption is not something that 
bureaucrat involved in it would display ostentatiously. Corrupt transactions are 
clandestine and therefore, risky. 
In the environment with corrupt bureaucracy the allocation of government permits 
and licenses is unpredictable. Therefore, the private firms’ output depending on such 
permits and licenses are also subject to uncertainty. 
The another important aspect is that in the environment with highly corrupt and 
predatory bureaucracy there is always a risk that a private agent can be framed and 
extorted bribes by the public officials. 
For example, Polinsky and Shavell (2001) studies corruption in the imposition of 
sanctions for violations of law and shows that the outcomes for the private agents may 
vary quite significantly depending on the regulation and enforcement structure and 
attitudes to risk.  
Put another way, corruption leads to increased uncertainty for the private agents, as 
their disposable income may vary depending on the interactions with the public officials. 
In this paper, I would like to investigate how this type of uncertainty affects economic 
growth. 
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There is a quite extensive body of literature on the effects of income volatility on 
saving and investment. The model introduced by Bewley (1977) pioneered studies on 
growth impact of the labour income risk. The Bewley-type models focus on the 
precautionary saving and wealth distribution caused by the labour income uncertainty 
(Aiyagari, 1994; Calvet, 2001; Huggett, 1997). These studies infer that the labour-income 
risk leads to lower interest rates and over-saving in the steady state.  
The models developed by Angeletos (2005), Angeletos and Calvet (2005) investigate 
the impact of idiosyncratic risk in production and investment. These studies find that in 
the presence of the production uncertainty, risk aversion dominates over the 
precautionary saving behaviour of the agents. 
The aforementioned Bewley type models are mainly built around the assumption that 
there is no aggregate uncertainty1. The analysis of the relationship between risk and 
growth at the aggregate level is also interesting. A group of related papers by Eaton 
(1981), Gertler and Grinols (1982), Grinols and Turnovsky (1993) (1998) among others 
address this question. They analyse how risk related to different aggregate variables 
affects growth. These models predict that volatility and the related risk adversely affect 
growth. 
Interestingly, not all empirical studies confirm the negative association between 
volatility and growth. At least the earlier findings of Kormendi and Meguire (1985) and 
Grier and Tullock (1989) based on cross-country data show that higher output volatility is 
correlated with higher average growth rate. Analysing the US data, Tsai et al. (1997) find 
no evidence on the relationship between output volatility and growth after accounting for 
the volatility associated with terms of trade, government expenditure, and monetary 
environment.  
Contrary to the foregoing results, Ramey and Ramey (1995) conclude based on their 
empirical analysis that a higher macroeconomic volatility is associated with lower long-
term growth. Aizenman and Marion (1993) (1999) also argue that there is significant 
correlation between volatility and private investment. 
                                                 
1Although there are extensions of Bewley model in this direction too; for example Krusell and Smith 
(1998) 
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Denizer, Iyugun, and Owen (2000) state that corruption can be an important factor 
contributing to volatility. Campos (2001) argue that predictability of corruption is also 
important and plays significant role in determining its growth impact. The idea that the 
secrecy stemming out of the illegal nature of corruption imposes an additional burden on 
the economy has been indicated by Shleifer and Vishny (1993).  
It is clear that secrecy of corrupt transactions adds to the uncertainty related to dealing 
with bureaucracy. This additional risk can contribute to the overall volatility in the 
economy, since due to corruption the volatility at the individual level increases. 
The economic impact of corruption has been studied extensively (Acconcia and 
d’Amato, 2006; Barelli and Pessôa, Barelli and Pessôa; Barreto, 2000; Huntington, 1968; 
Leff, 1964; Lui, 1985, 1996; Mauro, 1995, 1998, 2004; Rivera-Baitiz, 2002; Rose-
Ackerman, 1998, 1999, 2002, 2004). However, the literature on corruption has neglected 
the growth impact of the uncertainty created by corruption. The aim of the paper is to 
tackle this problem. 
The idea that the institutional structure may cause uncertainty has been captured in 
the model by Lin and Yang (2001) and Eichhorn (2006). They investigate a stochastic 
growth model with the uncertainty caused by tax evasion. In this paper I essentially 
would like to extend their model by broadening the uncertainty related to institutions. To 
analyse the effect of corruption-caused uncertainty on the capital accumulation, I employ 
a stochastic dynamic growth model with a public sector. In the model, I suppose that the 
corrupt interactions between the private and public sectors create random shocks to 
private disposable income. In particular, the model of Lin and Yang (2001) is extended 
by assuming a production function with a public input and income shocks engendered by 
the public sector. 
Lin and Yang (2001) find that the growth rate is always higher for the environment 
with tax evasion. Their finding hinges on the assumption that public goods do not affect 
both consumption and production, and the tax rates are not optimized. Eichhorn (2006) 
shows that the optimizing government chooses higher tax rates and achieves the same 
growth rates as if there were no tax evasion, or in other words, tax evasion is neutral to 
the rate of economic growth. 
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The uncertainty in my model stems out not only from tax evasion but also from the 
predatory behaviour of the corrupt public officials. In my model, corruption takes place 
both in tax collection and public good production.  
The rationale for this assumption stems from the fact that corruption always involves 
the public sector, therefore, the effects of corruption should be considered as an integral 
part of the public sector- private sector interactions.  
It is a standard approach to aggregate the interactions between the public and private 
sectors by means of two variables. Namely, the net taxes, T and the government spending 
G. Then it seems reasonable to analyse corruption as distortions created with regards to 
these two variables.  
Based on this rationale we have the following distortions created by corruption: First, 
the corrupt tax inspectors conceal tax evasion for the bribes paid by detected tax evaders. 
Second, the corrupt public officials abuse the authority given to them by attaching 
excessive red tape to the public services they are supposed to provide. 
It is supposed that excessive red tape is a set of unnecessary procedures that has no 
productive value for firms. The firms have to incur the burden of excessive red tape in 
order to obtain the essential public services.  
The corrupt officials can decrease the excessive red tape for the bribes paid by the 
firms. As a result, the corrupt officials capture a part of firms’ profits. This income 
redistribution from the firms to the corrupt officials effectively imposes an illegal tax on 
the firms.  
The degree or extent of corruption depends on the quality of the institutions 
embodying the public sector. Contrary to Lin and Yang (2001), it is demonstrated that 
when the productive inputs provided by the public sector accounted for, tax evasion leads 
to suboptimal growth in the decentralised setting. The social planner can increase the tax 
rate to account for the loss in tax revenue from evasion and thus voids the impact of tax 
evasion on growth.  
This result supports Eichhorn (2006), though he derived his result in a setting 
different from mine. Then it is shown that an increase in corruption via the associated 
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income uncertainty leads to less capital accumulation. This results in further deterioration 
of growth. 
The structure of the paper is as follows: first, the setup of the basic model is 
described, then the implications based on the optimal solution obtained for the model is 
analysed. Based on the results, the basic model is extended to the environment with 
corruption to analyse its growth effects.  
2  THE BASIC MODEL 
Let us start with the simple case. First, we want to examine the growth effect of tax 
evasion under the assumption that the government provides an essential productive input 
to private production as in Barro (1990). In this assumption my model is different from 
the model used in Lin and Yang (2001) and Eichhorn (2006), for they assume 
unproductive public services. In addition, we can assume that the probability of detection 
of a tax evader is endogenous and depends on the rate of tax evasion. 
Let us consider a closed economy with ex-ante identical infinitely-lived agents with 
zero population growth. Each agent has a measure of utility defined by a function on 
private consumption c. The utility function is given by  
 ( ) ln( )u c c=  (1) 
Assume that the agents maximize their expected utility  
 { }0 0(0) ( ( )) ( )U E ln c t exp t dρ∞= ∫ t−  (2) 
where ρ  is the constant rate of time preference. Further, when it does not distort the 
underlying idea we omit the time argument. 
Assume the production function has the following form:  
 1a ay Ak g −=  (3) 
where  y  is output per capita, A is TFP coefficient,  is per worker capital,  is per 
worker public input. It is assumed that the production function is stationary within the 
planning horizon. 
k g
The government imposes an income tax at a flat rate τ . To increase their disposable 
income the agents evade taxes by underreporting their true income. We assume that the 
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agent reports only  of his total income y in per capita terms. To combat tax 
evasion the government audits taxpayers randomly and depending on the evasion rate 
detects the evasion. The joint probability of being audited and detected is given by 
(1- )  e y
p . 
This probability is expressed as  
 p eφ=  (4) 
where is the tax evasion rate, 1e <  (0,1) φ ∈ is the institutional parameter that captures 
the effectiveness of the bureaucracy including tax administration. The detected evader 
pays back the due tax liability and some additional fine. This penalty is determined by a 
penalty rate =1+sθ , which includes the tax evaded and a surcharge for s. The tax paid by 
the agent is then either (1- )T e y eyτ θτ= + with probability p , or with 
probability . Consequently, the expected tax payment for the agent is expressed as  
 
 (1- )T e= y
p1-q =
= (1-e)y+p eyT τ θτ  (5) 
The random part of the agent’s income can be d
tax 
escribed by the return on one unit of 
evaded: with probability p the return equals to -  ,r s= and with probability 1-q p= , 
equals 1r = . Then the expected return on a unit of tax evaded is found as  
 (- ) (1- ) 1 1- (1 )r p s p p s= ⋅ + ⋅ = +  (6) 
y denotingB  =1+sθ  we re-write (6) as  
 1-r p= θ  (7) 
hen the agent’s income is given by  T
 (1dy ) (1 )y p ey wττ θ τ+ − +  (8) 
here the first two terms stand for the deterministic part o
= −
w f the income, w eyWσ=  is the t
stochastic part, σ  is a constant, W  is defined as a Wiener process. Later, we will discuss 
the rationale for this assumption. 
By introducing a notation 
 
(1 )e reτ=τ − , the agent’s income can be put as  
 (1y )e td t y w= − (9) 
The variance of the return on tax evasion is give
 2
+  
n by the following 1 :  
2 2pqσ θ τ=  (10) 
                                                 
1The derivation is given in Appendix  
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It is assumed that >0 r and thus risk-averse taxpayers evade taxes, as the expected 
turn is positive. Since in our model all agent
taxe rn t
ble of tax evasion has a binomial distribution. Then we can 
assu
re s are identical ex-ante, all agents evade 
s as soon as the retu o tax evasion is positive. Thus, the value of after-tax income 
is random and depends on being caught and penalized for tax evasion or being successful 
in the act of tax evasion.  
Assuming that the probability of audit and detection is random for the taxpayer, we 
can conclude that this gam
me that the decision process of the taxpayers follows the Markov process. It is said 
that a stochastic process tx  has the Markov property if  k 2∀ ≥  and t, the probability of 
outcome in period 1 t + is conditional on the state in period t :  
 1 1 1| , ,..., ) ( |t t t t k tP x x x x Pr x+ − − +( ).tr x=  
strib urrent state. 
This assumption is based on the following logic. Let us ask ourselves this question: If 
 and is the 
pro
dits them with a higher probability in the next year, which means 
for 
That is the future di ution of the states depends only on the c
the tax evader is caught then should his future behaviour be affected
bability of the detection in the future for this particular taxpayer different?  Let us try 
to elaborate on this. 
Assume that the tax administration creates a “black-list” or prior tax-evasion records 
of the offenders and au
those who has not been detected in the current year the probability of detection 
decreases even further, so that, they should increase their evasion. Thus, rational 
taxpayers should take account of this strategy employed by the tax administration and 
should not evade in the following year if caught in the current year. Therefore, the costly 
audit carried out by the tax administration would turn out in vain, and would be 
inefficient, as the other taxpayers not caught in the previous period would increase their 
evasion rate in the next period. It is evident, for the tax administration it is an efficient 
strategy to keep its audit random and with some probability (which depends on the cost 
of conducting an audit) equally faced by all taxpayers. That effectively means that the 
probability of audit and detection of this year should be independent from the similar 
events in other years. 
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Based on this logic, the administration path cannot be non-stationary. If we assume 
non-stationarity of the tax administration and taxpayer’s behaviour that essentially means 
that
gent’s income
 we are assuming that if once caught for tax evasion the taxpayer’s propensity to 
evasion decreases significantly forever. Then the government can in fact carry out tax 
audit of all taxpayers (as we assume a finite number of agents) over some finite number 
of years and thus significantly decrease tax evasion or eliminate it for good. Yet, the real 
life experience tells us that tax evasion is persistent even in the countries with very strong 
administrative machinery. 
Based on the Markovian nature of the control variables it can be shown that the 
cumulative change of the a  0( )ty y−  follows a binomial distribution as we 
hav
pital 
evo
e and what part – to save. As the households 
are 
e only two outcomes. The random process, when the number of steps goes to infinity, 
converges to a Wiener process (also known as the Brownian motion)1 . By ascertaining 
that the tax evasion process is the Wiener process we open a new avenue for analysis, as 
it allows us to employ a well-established stochastic dynamic optimization approach. 
Lin and Yang (2001) first apply this methodology to capital accumulation problem 
with tax evasion and come up with a stochastic model of each individual’s ca
lution. In my case I follow their approach; however, the first and second moments of 
the linear stochastic Itô differential equation are different as I am assuming a different 
functional form for the production process. 
The households in their pursuit of utility maximization face a resource constraint in 
deciding what part of their income to consum
facing stochastic disposable incomes depending on the success of tax evasion, the 
amount of capital accumulation also follows a stochastic process. Based on our 
assumption that the random part of the disposable income of the agents follows the 
Wiener process, the amount of capital accumulation is given by the following linear 
stochastic Itô differential equation: 
 [(1- ) - ] ( )dk r e y c dt ey dWτ τ σ= + +  (11) 
where σ  is the standard deviation of the normalized process of random return on tax 
vasion, is the Wiener process. 
                                                
 We
 
1As in Chang (2004); Dixit and Pindyck (1994)  
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We em loy the dynamic programming method in dealing with the optimal control 
problems we face here. We digre
p
ss here to describe the method following Dixit and 
Pin
We start with the description of theory of dynamic programming in an environment with 
ete Markov process and then later show that the theory can 
tate variables. The current value of the 
stat
io of the future states. The c l 
cum iven b
)t+ .
sequence into two steps: the current period and all the future periods. Assume that the 
cur
dyck (1994)1 . 
2.1  Dynamic programming 
uncertainty modelled as a discr
be extended to continuous-time Wiener process. 
Since we are interested in the decision of the households, we consider the household 
choosing its control variables and affecting its s
e variable tk  is known, but all future values 1 2, ...t tk k+ +  are random variables. It is 
assumed that the values of the state variable follow the Markov process. At time t  the 
household can choose its control variable value tc . 
The state and control variables at time t determine the household’s utility ( , )t t tu k c . 
The  k and c  affect the probability distribut n t t onditiona
ulative probability distribution of the state in the next period is g y 
( | ,t t tk k cΦ  
The main idea employed in the dynamic programming is to split the decision 
1
rent time is t  and the state is tk  Let us denote by ( )t tI k  the expected present value of 
all of the households utility flows, when the household makes all decisions optimally 
from this point onwards. 
When the household chooses the control variable tc , it obtains current utility of 
( , )t t tu k c . At the next period ( 1)t + , the state is determined by 1tk + . From that point in 
time onwards the sum of optimal utility flows are given by 1 1( )t tI k+ + . At the current 
 expected value 1 1[ ( )]t t tE I k+ +period t the households treats it as an
                                                
. 
 
1Dixit and Pindyck (1994), pp. 79-90 
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In the present-value terms, the overall utility is given by 1 1
1( [ ( )]u k E I k . , )
1t t t t t
c ρ + ++ +
Then the households chooses  to maximize the lifetime utility, which is equal to tc ( )t tI k . 
We write it as  
 1 1
1( ) m x ( , ) [ ( )] .t t t t t t tI k u k c E I k+ +a 1c ρ
⎧ ⎫= +⎨ ⎬  (1+⎩ ⎭ 2) 
The expression (12) in fact is Bellman’s Principle of Optimality, which claims that if 
e policy is optimal then the remaining choices represent an op
to the problem starting at the state that resulted from the initial state due to whatever was 
the initial action. In other wo
th timal policy with respect 
rds, at any given period the agent needs to choose only the 
current control value optimally. Equation (12) is also called the Bellman equation. 
In a more general form the Bellman equation is written as  
 1( ) max ( , ) [ ( ' | , )]t 1c
I k u k c E I k k cρ
⎧ ⎫= +⎨ ⎬  (1+⎩ ⎭ 3) 
where instead of  and  we use k and k' as it could be any of possible states, and also tk 1tk +
the ( )tI k  is written without time index as the value function has the sam
tu he 
he B
e form for all 
periods, by the vir e of t stationarity property. 
T ellman equation can be adjusted for the case when time is continuous. Assume 
that time changes in increments of tΔ . Then the instantaneous utility is given by 
( , , )u k c t  is then ( , , )u k c t tΔ. The utility over the time of tΔ . Since ρ  is the discount 
rate per unit of time, the total discounting over the time of tΔ  is given by 1
1 tρ+ Δ . The 
Bellman equation then can be written as  
1
c
⎧ ⎫
⎩( ,  ) max  ( , , )   [ ( ', | , )]  1I k t u k c t t E I k t t k ctρ= Δ + + Δ⎨ ⎬+ Δ ⎭  
Multiplying by (1+ t)ρΔ  and rearranging yields  
{ }
{ }
( , ) max ( , , ) (1 ) [ ( ', ) ( , )]
max , , ) (1 ) [ ]c t t t E Iρ= Δ + Δ + Δ(
c
c
tI k t u k c t t t E I k t t I k t
u k
ρ ρΔ = Δ + Δ + + Δ −
 
Dividing this equation by and taking the limit with regards to  tΔ t 0,Δ → we get  
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1( , ) lim ( , , ) [ ]
c
I k t u k c t E dI
dt
ρ ⎧ ⎫= +⎨ ⎬⎩ ⎭  (14) 
However, we need the Bellman equation that reflects the optimal decision process, 
when the state variable is defined by the It 11). 
ssume that the state variable, per capita capital stock k, fo
given by 
 
ô stochastic differential equation as in (
A llows a Wiener’s process and 
( , ) ( , )dk a k t dt b k t dW= +  (15) 
Then the Itô’s lemma states that for a function ( , )I k t which is twice differentiable in 
k and at least once in t the differential dI is given by  
2
2)k  (16)  2
1 (
2
I I IdI dt dk d
t k k
∂ ∂ ∂= + +∂ ∂ ∂
 
Taking into account (15) we write  
21I I I⎡ ⎤∂ ∂ ∂2
2( , ) ( , ) ( , )2
IdI a k t b k t dt b k t dW
t k k
∂= + + +⎢ ⎥∂ ∂ ∂⎣ ⎦
 (17) 
Applying the Itô’s lemma to the value function we get  
x∂
[ ] 22 2 ( )t o tΔ + Δ   1( , ) | , ( , ) ( , , ) ( , , )2
I I IE I k k t t k c I k t a k c t b k c t
t k k
⎡ ⎤∂ ∂ ∂+ Δ + Δ = + + +⎢ ⎥∂ ∂ ∂⎣ ⎦
where an . Using this result we 
can write (14) as  
( )o tΔ  stands for the terms that tend to zero faster th tΔ
2
2
2
1( , ) max ( , , ) ( , , ) ( , , )
2c
I I II k t u k c t a k c t b k c t
t k
ρ ⎧ ⎫∂ ∂= + + +⎨ ⎬∂ ∂⎩ ⎭k
∂
∂   (18) 
 of and  is found by comparing (15) and (11) or The specific form ( , , )a k c t ( , , )b k c t
( , , ) (1 )a k c t r e y cτ τ= − + − and . That yield the following state 
dynamics:  
 
( , , )b k c t eyσ=
[(1 ) ] ( )dk r e y c dt ey dWτ τ σ= − + − +  (19) 
ation
An individu
2.2  The household’s optimiz   
al household maximizes its expected overall utility by choosing consumption 
vel c and tax evasion rate e subject to the resource constraint.
 
le   
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 max U =, 0 ( ) ( )c e ln c exp t dtρ
∞ −∫  (20) 
 s.t. [(1 ) ] ( )dk r e y c dt ey dWτ τ σ= − + − +   (21) 
 00 (1 ) , 0 , (0)c r e y k kτ τ≤ ≤ − + ≤ =− − k  (22) 
  (23) 
This problem is transformed to the Bellman equation a
 
0 1e≤ ≤
s it is explained earlier:  
( ) 21( , ) max ln( ( )) '( ) 1 "( )( )
2c
I k t c t I k r e y c I k eyρ τ τ σ= + − + − +⎡ ⎤⎨ ⎬⎣ ⎦⎩ ⎭  (24) 
here 
⎧ ⎫
{ }, 0 0( ) ( ) ( )c eI k max E ln c exp t dtρ∞= ∫  w − s.t. (11), (21),(22), (23). In other words, 
( ) I k  is the value function,  is the conditional expectation operator for the given initial 
 capital, 
 FOC of the Bellman equation (24) le
 
0E
value of 0(0)k k= . 
The ads to  
1( )
'( )
c t
I k
=  (25) 
 
¯
2
'( )( )
''( ) ( )
I k re t
I k y t
τ
σ= −  (26) 
Inserting back (26) and (25) into (24) we get  
 
2
2
2
1
( )1 1( ) ln ( ) 1( ) ( )( ) ( )
1 ( )
( )( )
2 ( ) ( )I k y tσ
[ (1ln 1 ( )(1 ) ( )( )
I k r
I k I k r yI k I kI k y t
I k r
I k y
IgI k A kI k
α
τρ τ τ σ
τσ
τ −
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞′⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎟⎜ ⎟⎜⎢ ⎥⎟ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜′ ⎟= + − + − −⎜ ⎜⎟ ⎟⎟⎜ ⎜⎟⎢ ⎥⎟ ⎟⎜⎜ ⎜′ ′⎜ ⎟⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎜ ′′⎜ ⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
⎛ ⎞′ ⎟⎜′′ ⎟+ − =⎜ ⎟
′⎛ ⎞⎟⎜ ′= − + − −⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ′⎝ ⎠
⎜ ⎟⎜ ′′⎝ ⎠
2 2
2
)] ( )
2 ( )
k r
I k
τ
σ′′
 (27) 
A general solution of this differential equation can be expressed in the following 
form, ( )( ) ln k CI k ρ
+= . A substitution for ( )I k  in (27) leads to:  
 
1 2
2
(1 ) ( )1 (( ) ln( ) 1
2
gA rkI k k
ατ τρ )ρ ρ ρ
−⎡ ⎤−⎢ ⎥= − + +⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦σ
 (28) 
However, we know that due to tax evasion the public input g is given by  
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 (1 )g re y yτ ετ= − =  (29) 
Taking into account the production function given by (3), we write  
 1g Ak gα ατε −=  (30) 
y rearranging (30), we obtain  
 
B
g A
α
τ
k
ε⎛ ⎞ =⎜ ⎟  (31) 
y inserting (31) into (28), we get  
⎝ ⎠
B
1
21 (1 ) ( ) ( )A A r
α
ατ τε τ( ) ( ) 1I k ln kρ 22ρ ρ= − +⎢ ρσ+
−⎡ ⎤−⎢ ⎥⎥⎢⎣ ⎦
26) that,  
 (33) 
⎥
 (32) 
Then we can find from (25) and (
 ( )c t kρ=
( )12 (e t) rgA k
τ
α−σ
=  (34) 
ubstituting (33) and (34) into (11) we obtain the equation of the c
 
S apital evolution:  
( )
2
1( )([1 ] )
r r k
dk Ak g k dt dWα α
τ ττ ρ σ
−= − + − +  (35) 
35) by  we get  
12 gA k
ασ −
kDividing (
( ) 21 2( )((1 ) ) rdt dWτρ +  (36) dk rgA kk
α ττ σ σ
−= − + − 
Then the per capita growth rate equals  
( ) 21 2( )(1 )e c dk rgE A kc k
α τγ τ σ
−⎛ ⎞⎟⎜= = = − + −⎟⎜ ⎟⎜⎝ ⎠
? ρ  (37)  
gBy substituting for 
k⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
⎛ ⎞  from (31) we get  
1
2
2
( )
(1 ) ( )e
r
A A
αα τγ τ τε σ
−= − + − ρ  (38) 
sence of tax evasion the growth rate would be 
given by  
By analogy, we can show that in the ab
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10 (1 ) ( )A A
ααγ τ τ − ρ= − −  (39) 
Comparing (38) and (39), we see that tax evasion does not increase the growth rate 
stra e is  the gain from tax evasion to disposable 
income and the loss because of the lower productivity due to lower public input. 
herefore, the overall effect is ambiguous and depends on th
2.3
at government chooses tax rate so that the social welfare is maximized. Since, 
e economy populated with the identical individu
max
Corollary 1. For the government of the economy with identical individuals maximizing 
roducing with CRTS technology, welfare maximization is 
ightforwardly. Ther a trade-off between
T e on what effect is dominant. 
  Welfare optimization 
Assume th
th als, this problem reduces to the 
imization of the utility of the representative agent. It can be shown that for the 
current setup the welfare maximization is equivalent to maximization of the growth rate 
of the individual’s consumption. This result is formulated as the following corollary. The 
proof is given in Appendix 5.2
log utility function and p
equivalent to growth maximization.  
Based on this rationale we consider growth maximization by government by setting 
the optimal tax rate for the individuals. Let us start with the Cobb-Douglas case given by 
(3). By substituting for 2 2 2(1 )e eσ φ φ θ τ= − , 1r eφθ= − , andp eφ=  we state the 
growth maximization problem as:  
1 1
2
 2max (1 ) ( ) (1 (1 ) ) (1 )e
A A e e
e e
(1 )eα αα α φθ− − −
alue and thus 
ind
τ
γ τ τ φθ ρφ φ θ= − − − + −−  (40) 
Since the growth rate here is a result of the optimal reaction of the taxpayer to the 
given tax system, tax evasion, e , is not a variable but is a specific v
ependent of tax rate. The FOC of (40) gives us  
 
1 1 1
1 1(1 )
d
d
A
α α
α
γ φθ
ατ
− −
−+ −
 (41) 
1 1
(1 (1 ) ) ( )
(1 (1 ) ) ( ) 1 0
e A e e
e e
α α α
α α
α α
ττ
φθ τα
− −
= − − −
− − − =
Solving this yields  
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 * 1τ α= −  (42) 
This result for the optimal tax ra e is the same as we get from the optimization for the 
non-evasion case  
t
1
*
0max (1 ) ( ) 1c A A
α
α
0γ τ τ ρ τ
−
= − − ⇒ = − ,  α
 which is known as the Barro’s optimal tax rate. 
neral conclusions we need to consider the problem in a more 
eneral setting. For this purpose, we investigat
2.3.1  CRTS production case 
Assume that the technology is given by a function with constant returns to scale (CRTS), 
cale property, we can write  
 
In order to draw ge
g e the optimal tax problem for an economy 
with a more general form of the production function. In presentation, we follow Barro’s 
(1990) specification.  
( , )y F k g= . Then, using the constant returns to s
( , )  ( / )y F k g k g kϕ= =  (43) 
The government expenditure is given by  
   ( / )g y k g kτ τ ϕ= =  (44) 
1 [ ]rγ ρυ= −It is known that the growth rate for such economies is given by , where 
0ρ > is a constant rate of time preference, 1 0υ >  is a constant intertemporal elasticity of 
substitution. However, the equilibrium interest rate should equal the private return to 
capital (1 ) yr
k
τ= − ∂ . For the production function given by (
∂ 43) this return is then written 
s  
 
a
(1 ) (1 ) ( / )[1 ( / ) ]g k g y
k
τ τ ϕ ϕ′− = − −∂  45) 
y∂ (
Therefore, the growth rate in this environment can be stated as  
 [ ]1 (1 ) (1 ) ,γ τ ϕ η ρυ= − − −  (46) 
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where η τ he elasticity of y with respect to g  for given k . The steady-state ϕ′=  is t
growth implies that if the tax rate is constant, then  /g y g k  and  are constant. 
The optimization procedure leads to the condition:  
 
 / , η
[ ]{ }
( )
1
(1 ) (1 )
1
d d
d
(1 ) (1 )
1 (1 )
(1 )
d d
d
γ τ ϕ η ρτ τ υ
η ϕ τ ϕυ τ
τ ϕ ϕη ϕ
ϕ
υ
= − − −
⎡ ⎤= − − + −⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
1
1
(1 ) (1 )
υ η
ϕ η τ ϕυ
⎡ ⎤′−⎢ ⎥= − − +
′
 (47) ⎢ ⎥−⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤= − − + −⎣ ⎦
1
( 1) 0ϕ ϕ⎡ ⎤′= − =⎣ ⎦
( )d
d
ϕτ  is found by making use of the fact that ) : 
 
/ ( /g k g kτϕ=
( ) ( )'d d
d d
ϕ ϕ ϕ τ ϕτ τ
⎛ ⎞= +⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  (48) 
By simplifying, we get  
 
( )
( )
(1 ') '
' '
(1 ') (1 )
d
d
d
d
ϕ τϕ ϕ ϕτ
ϕ ϕ ϕϕ ϕτ τϕ η
⇒ − =
⇒ = =− −
 (49) 
We inf  growth maxim zation is attained when 
′ = . 
Let us repeat this optimization procedure for the case with tax evasion. Assume that 
the is determined by , where  is the equilibrium 
income-reporting rate. Then we re-write the growth rate as  
 
er from the result in (49) that the i
ϕ 1
 equilibrium tax evasion * (1 )e ε= − ε
[ ]1 (1 ) (1 )eγ ετ ϕ εη ρυ= − − −  (50) 
Here g yετ= andη τϕ′
The FOC of (50) with respect to 
= .  
 is found as  τ
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[ ]{ }
( )
1
(1 ) (1 )
(1 ) (1 )
ed d
d d
d
γ ετ ϕ εη ρτ τ υ
εη εϕ ετ ϕυ τ
= − − −
1
1 (1 )
(1 )
1
(1 ) (1 )
d
ετ εϕεη εϕυ εη
ϕε εη ετ εϕ ϕυ
ϕυ
⎡ ⎤= − − + −⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
⎡
 
1
1
( 1) 0ϕε
ϕ ⎤′−⎢ ⎥= − − +⎢ ⎥−⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤′= − − + −⎣ ⎦
Again, we obtain an optimality condition given by  as in the case with no-
evasion. Hence, we conclude that the optimality condition for the public input is not 
affected by tax evasion, and formulate the following proposition: 
Proposition 1: Given that all tax revenue is used to prod
production and the efficiency of the public sector is independent of tax evasion, and the 
production function exhibits CRTS, tax evasion has no effect on the optimality condition 
for the public input. 
hieve 
rate. The government’s 
task then becomes to equate the effective tax rate to the optimal tax rate, as it stems from 
the optim
 (51) 
⎡ ⎤′= − =⎣ ⎦
1ϕ′ =
uce public input to private 
Implication of this proposition is that in order to ac the optimal level of the 
public input to production, the government chooses tax rate in a way that it takes into 
account the rate of tax evasion, and thus targets the effective tax 
ality condition we obtained earlier.  
In both cases, we have the optimality condition ' ' 1n eϕ ϕ= = , where subscripts n an e 
stand for no-tax evasion and tax evasion cases respectively. Denoting by  and  the 
am
ng eg
ount of public input in the environment with no-evasion and with evasion 
correspondingly, we write down the equality of optimality conditions 
' 'n en e
g g
k k
ϕ ϕ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞=⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ . This leads to the equality of the variables n eg g= , for the given 
amount of k  on the optimal growth path. However tion of the balanced 
gov
, under the assump
ernment budget, we can substitute the public output with the tax revenue and write  
 n ey y  (52) τ ετ=
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where nτ  is the tax rate in no evasion environment, eτ  is the tax rate for the environment 
with evasion. Then we can find the optimal tax rate for the environment with tax evasion.  
 
*
* n
e
ττ ε=  (53) 
As 1ε <  in the presence of tax evasion, the optimal tax rate for the environment 
with tax evasion must be adjusted upwards in order to equalize the effective tax rate with 
e optimal tax rate for the environment withou
account for tax evasion, so that the effective tax rate is equal to the optimal tax rate for 
e no tax evasion case. 
Based on Proposition
or the no-evasion environment, then the resulting growth path 
would be suboptimal. Note that in the presence of tax evasion the effective tax rate is 
fou
th t tax evasion. The result is formulated in 
the following corollary of Proposition 1. 
Corollary 2: Welfare maximizing government sets the optimal tax rate in order to 
th
This result is valid under the assumption that tax evasion does not cause any cost 
except the uncertainty it creates. 
2.4  Decentralised equilibrium 
 1, we can also show that tax evasion is not growth enhancing in a 
decentralised setting. Suppose the government ignores tax evasion and sets the tax rate 
equal to the optimal rate f
nd as (1 )e reτ τ= −  (as in(9)). For the sake of simplicity of exposition, we denote 
the equilibrium income-reporting rate as  
 (54)  (1 )reε = −
and write e eτ τ= . Next, we note that the disposable income in the presence of tax 
evasion given by 
1 2
2
( )(1 ) ( )de
ry A A
α
α ττ τε σ
−
= − +  can also be expressed as  
 
1
(1 ) ( )e A A
α
αγ τε τε ρ
−
= − −  (55) 
As both expressions of the growth rate are equivalent, we write the following identity:  
1 1
2( )
( )
r
A
αα
2
(1 ) ( ) (1 )A A A
αα ττε τε ρ τ σ
−− − ≡ − τε ρ− + −  (56)  
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From (56) we infer that growth effect of tax evasion is two-prong: namely, there is a 
positive impact, 
2
2
( )r τ
σΛ pact through lower public i= , and a negative im nput provision. 
Some manipulation of (56) leads us to  
 
1 11
(1 )A
α α
α αατ ε τ ε
− −
Λ = −  (57) 
The loss is found as a difference of the first terms of (56) and (57)  
 
1 1
(1 ) ( ) (1 ) ( )A A A A
α αα α
1 1 1
(1 ) (1 )A
α αα α
τ τ τ τε− −Ζ = − − −
 (58) 
state the o
effects  
ατ τ ε− −= − −
Now we can verall growth effect of the tax evasion as a sum of these two 
1 1
1
α αα αα α
− −
1 1 1
1 1
1 1
(1 ) (1 ) (1 )
[ (1 ) (1 )(1 )]
A A
A
α αα α
α α αα αα α 
1 1
1
[ (1 ) (1 )]A
α αα α
γ τ ε τ ε τ τ ε
τ ε τ ε τ ε
− −
− − −
Δ = Λ−Ζ = − − − −
= − − − −
With all other things being equal, only tax evasion can mak
for the economy with the possibility of tax evasion. Given this condition what is the tax 
eva
 
ατ ε τε τ− −= − − −
 (59) 
e the growth rate different 
sion choice that maximizes the growth effect?  This gives rise to the following:  
1 11
max [ (1 ) (1 )]
c
A
α α
α ααγ τ ε τε τ
− −
Δ = − − −  (60) 
The FOC of (60) leads to  
 
1 1 111 1 1[ (d A
d
α α α
α α ααγ α ατ ε τεε α α
− − −−Δ − −= − 1)] 0+ =  (61) 
A solution of which by the virtue of the fact that * 1τ α= −  yields  
 * 1ε =  (62) 
This result tells us that for the given specification of the economy, when the tax rate 
is set to the optimal level that is when * 1τ α= − , the socia
must be zero. This is not surprising, as any deviation from the optimal government size 
would lessen the growth rate. 
lly optimal tax evasion rate 
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We can see that if the tax rate were higher than the op al rate ttim hen some positive 
opt
nce does not take into
tcome should be suboptimal. 
evasion would be growth enhancing. On the other hand, if the tax rate were less than 
imal than tax evasion would only harm growth. However, the private agent takes the 
amount of the public services as given, he  account the adverse 
effect of his tax evasion on the public good production. Since the equilibrium tax evasion 
is non-zero, the decentralized ou
For the CRTS case, instead of maximizing the difference in the growth rates, as we 
did for the Cobb-Douglas case, we just carry out a growth maximization exercise with 
regards to tax evasion (which is the income reporting rate 1 reε = −  technically). The 
optimization leads us to the FOC:  
 1 (1 ) (1 ) [ (1 )] 0e d
de
γ τϕ εη ετ ϕ εηε υ
⎡ ⎤∂ = − − + − − =⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥∂ ⎣ ⎦  (63) 
Noting that,  
 [ (1 )] (1 ) .d d
d d
ϕϕ εη ϕη εηε ε− = − + −  (64) 
and taking into account that /g k = ( / )g kετϕ , we obtain '( )d d
d d
ϕ ϕϕ τϕ ετε ε= + . 
This leads to (1 )[ (1 )]
(1 )
d
d
εηϕ εη ϕη ϕε ετ
−− = − + − , then substituting it into
 
 (63) we get  
[ ]
[ ]
1 (
(1 ) (1 )[ ]
(1
1 )
1
(1 ) (1 ) (1 ) ]
(1 )(1 ) (1 ) 0
eγ εητϕ εη ετ ϕη ϕε υ
τϕ εη ετ ϕη εη ϕ
τ εη ετ ηυ
⎡ ⎤
)ετ−
υ
ϕ
∂ −⎢ ⎥= − − + − − +⎢ ⎥∂ ⎣ ⎦
= − − − − + −
= − − − − =
 (65) 
 for the optimal tax case , 
we transform (65) to  
 
We recall that 1  holds. This means η τϕ τ′= = . Soϕ′ =
[ ](1 )(1 ) (1 ) (1 )(1 2 ) 0eγ ϕ ϕτ εη ετ η ετ τε υ υ
∂ = − − − − = − − =∂  
The solution satisfying the FOC is  as the tax rate is always . However, 
is not possible by definition, thus we have a corner solution here with optimal income 
1ε > 1τ < 1ε >  
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rep
 the optimal level the socially optimal tax evasion rate is zero. 
Again, the atomistic private agent does not take into account his adverse effect of his 
aximizes his private gain from tax evasion, which leads 
y tha em is
orting rate 1ε = . This is equivalent to saying that tax evasion rate is zero. Therefore, 
when the tax rate is set to
tax evasion on production and m
to positive tax evasion. That is to sa t the private agent’s probl :  
 max (1 )
e
e ekφθ τ ϕΛ = −  (66) 
where we make use of  (1- )r ey r ek e ekτ τ ϕ φθ τ ϕΛ = = = . Then the equilibrium value for 
the tax evasion rate is positive and given by  
 * 1 1
2
e φθ= <  (67) 
Therefore, providing that the tax rate is set without accounting for tax evasion, the 
decentralized equilibrium is socially suboptimal in the environment with more general 
 tacking account of tax evasion 
evasion.  
  THE ECONOMY WITH CORRUPTION 
Since tax evasion may take place even in the absence of corruption, we need to 
cost. For that, the corrupt bureaucrat either 
CRTS technologies. By the government at best achieves 
the same growth rate as in the absence of tax 
3
incorporate corruption into the model specified above. The act of corruption happens 
when public officials attempt to capture rents by abusing the power entrusted to them 
from the government or the private agents. Corruption can take place ex ante or ex post. 
In the ex ante case, the corrupt bureaucracy creates a situation, when the public good is 
sold at a price higher than its marginal 
decreases supply of the public good or bundles it with excessive red tape. In the either 
case, the cost of public good is higher for the private agent. In case of shortage of the 
public good, the private agent pays higher price for the good as it is described by Shleifer 
and Vishny (1993). 
The other situations described by Barreto (2000) involves red tape in public good 
provision. Note, that in Barreto (2000) red tape generally is not a product of corruption, 
but rather a feature of any bureaucracy. Guriev (2004) also analyses red tape and 
corruption, and shows that when the bureaucracy is corrupt the level of red tape is above 
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the social optimum. In general, red tape is a type of the public service that produces 
useful information about the private agents. I assume that red tape is just an unproductive 
hur
oth agents. 
into the 
bas
compl le case of corruption, when 
the
proba
the mo  corruption in the public good provision. 
3.1  Corruption in tax collection 
dle created by corrupt officials. It is assumed that all other useful properties of the 
public sector including the informative red tape are embodied in the public goods they 
provide. In other words, my red tape is only the excessive red tape induced by the corrupt 
officials to coerce the private agents to pay bribes. 
The ex post corruption happens only after the interaction between the private and 
public agents. It usually involves the situation when the public agent obtains some 
information about the private agent’s failure in law or regulation abidance. Then in order 
to avoid the penalty for the infringement the private agent is willing to pay bribes to the 
public agent. A corrupt public agent chooses bribes and conceals the infringement. Thus, 
a corrupt deal occurs only if it is beneficial for the b
Based on the discussion above we specify the following forms of corruption: 
1. corruption in tax collection, which is manifested by concealment of the fact of tax 
evasion in case of detection by a corrupt tax inspector; 
2. corruption in public good production, which is manifested by use of public position 
to create excessive red tape (transfer services) to extort income from the private 
individuals.  
Since our modelling approach is to incorporate different types of corruption 
ic model we considered earlier, we need to discuss how each such an addition will 
icate the dynamics of the model. We start with a simp
 tax inspectors assigned to audit the taxpayers engage in corruption and with some 
bility conceals the tax evasion for the bribe paid by the tax evader. Then we extend 
del to include
We assume the same tax system as in the basic model described above. In other words, 
the probability of detection of the tax evader is given by p eφ=  and when detected the 
taxpayer should pay fine equal to ,eyθτ  where 1θ > . 
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An individual taxpayer treats the tax rate, tax audit probability, and penalty rate as 
ualit f the institutions or specifically in 
thei
 
given. We are also introducing corruptibility of the tax inspectors conducting the tax 
audits. We assume that a tax inspector can be corruptible with probability p1 . 
The extent of corruptibility depends on the q y o
r effectiveness in controlling corruption. Therefore, we can again write that the 
probability of the tax inspector being corrupt is a function of the quality of the public 
institutions:  
1 1( )p p φ=  
Due to corruption the penalty rate becomes random as when audited and detected a 
taxpayer may pay bribe instead of tax penalty. In other words, θ  in (8) should be 
adjusted to the following:  
with probabil  1
with probability 
q p
b p
θθ ity 1 11 −
1
= −⎧= ⎨ −  (68) 
In general the bribe rate depends on the bargaining power of the involved private 
onal arrangeme
e of the random penalty rate then is given by  
 
⎩
Where b θ<  is the bribe rate, so tax evasion costs the bribe paid instead of penalty, if the 
inspector is corrupt.  
agents, which again depends on the instituti nts. The less the risk for the 
tax inspector to be caught and punished the more bargaining power he wields.  
The expected valu
1 1 1[ ]E p b qθ θ θ= = +  (69) 
Since 10 1p≤ < , the expected penalty rate is lower when the tax inspectors are 
corrupt. 
Given the context, for an individual taxpayer being audited and getting a corrupt deal 
 random. Thus, disposable income after taxes and a
by,
is udit is also a random variable given 
  
 
(1 ) (1 ) , with probability 
(1 ) , with probability 1d
y ey
y
y ey p
τ θ τ
τ τ
⎧ − + −= ⎨ − + −⎩
p
 (70) 
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Then the random return on one unit of evaded tax is determined as 1cr =  with 
probability (1-p) and ( 1)r θ= − −  with probability p. The expected return to one unit of c
evaded tax is given by 1cr eφθ= − . We notice that if the decrease in the eff nalty 
te is dominates the increase in tax evasion rate, or 
ective pe
cr r≥ ,ra  the ex
tax with corruption is higher th
evasion increases with corruption in taxation, as the effective penalty rate is strictly 
 return on 
pected return on evaded 
an without corruption. In any case, we conclude that tax 
lower. 
The variance of the tax evasion is found as in the case for the tax evasion 
without corruption:  
 2 2 2c pqσ θ τ=  (71) 
With corruption in the tax collection the level of the public good is defined as  
 cg yετ=  (72) 
With corruption in taxation, 1 reε < − , as a part of the amount paid by the taxpayer is 
the bribes paid to the tax inpectors. 
Since cr r≥  and the tax evasion rate is greater, we conclude from
nt without 
orruption. 
 
 (72) that with 
corruption the amount of public good produced is less than in the environme
c
For the setting with corruption in taxation, the private disposable income is expressed 
by  
(1 )d cy r e y wττ τ= − + +  (73) 
We notice that except the rate of return to tax evasion cr r≥  and its variance 2cσ , the 
disposable income is found in similar way to the case without corruption. Using the 
exp
mic system:  
 
ression obtained for disposable income, we can state the transition equation of this 
dyna
( )
2( )
c
r r k
t
k
τ τ1
1
2
[1 ]c cc
c c
dk Ak g k d dW
gA
α α
ατ ρ σ
⎛ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ +
⎝ ⎠
4
σ
−
− ⎟⎜= − + − ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜
 (7 ) 
⎞
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Analogously with the basic model described earlier, we can find the growth rate and 
the control functions:  
1
2
2
( )
(1 ) ( ) cc
c
r
A A
αα τγ τ τε σ
−= − + − ρ  (75) 
 ( )12 cc gA k ασ −
 
cre
τ=  (76) 
 (77) 
Examining (75), (76), and (77) we infer that the corru
increases tax evasion, but does not change the structure of the model. Consequently, the 
ynamics of the model does not change with th
collection. Therefore, we conclude that Proposition 1 holds for the environment with 
orruption in tax collection. 
ruption in public good provision occurs through creation of 
red tape, which is used to extract rents from the private agents. Specifically, we suppose 
to produce. Also we should introduce a concept of technology for the public 
goo
c kρ=
ption in tax collection only 
d e introduction of corruption in tax 
c
3.2  Excessive red tape and deterministic income extortion 
It is logical to start the dynamic analysis of corruption in public good provision with 
deterministic case, then incorporate the uncertainty this type of corruption may give rise. 
As we discussed earlier, cor
that the public officials create excessive red tape and extort a part of private after-tax 
income. 
Effectively, the tax revenue accrued to the government is used to produce of the 
public input into the private production and excessive red tape, which enables the corrupt 
officials to coerce the private agents to pay bribes. One may argue that the cost of red 
tape creation is negligible so should be ignored. So we assume that red tape does not cost 
anything 
d production. After all public goods are also produced by the human beings and thus 
the way they organize this production process should determine their output.  
Since the public sector is embodied in different public institutions, the quality or 
organizational level of these institutions should play a crucial role in determining the 
productivity or the efficiency of the public sector. We assumed in (4) that the quality of 
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the public institutions can be measured by index (0,1)φ ∈ . The values of this index in the 
public good provision context can be interpreted as follows: As all public institutions are 
established for some purpose, then an institutions with =1φ  implies that this institution 
serves its purpose fully.  
In order to make the setup a bit more general, we can assume that the productivity of 
the public sector depends of the average quality index φ  and given by  
 = (  )ψ ψ φ  
Then depending on the quality (or efficiency) of the public sector the same amount of 
tax revenue can be transformed to varying amount of public goods. This condition is 
formulated as the budget balance given by  
 g= yψετ  (78) 
here  is the productive public input, g ψw  is the productivity coefficient, while 
y T  ετ = .  
It is also intuitive that the capability of the bureaucracy to create excessive red tape 
e institutions of the governm
ay have plenty of opportunities to be engaged in the 
low.  
vernment size. Nevertheless, for the simplicity we are assuming this linear 
dep
depends on the quality of th ent. In countries with weak 
public institutions, the bureaucrats m
rent seeking through excessive red tape, as the possibility of detection and punishment is 
At the same time, the larger public sector size also should be associated with greater 
red tape. The reason for that is that the more interactions between the government and the 
private sector the more chances for the bureaucrats to extort bribes from the private 
agents. In general, the increase in extortions should not be proportional to the increase in 
the go
endence as an approximation.  
Suppose, as a result, the public official by accepting bribes captures a rent equal to  
 (  , , )R R g bφ=  (79) 
Put another way, the rent captured by the bureaucracy is related to the rate bribes in 
taxation, the size of the public sector and its quality. It is reasonable to assume that an 
increase in the size of the government should lead to a proportional increase in rents 
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cap in 
e efficiency of the extortive behaviour of the b
tured by the bureaucracy. The quality of the public institutions should be embodied 
th ureaucrats. The bribe rates in all public 
sectors should be comparable, thus the bribes paid in taxation should affect bribes paid in 
other public sector activities.  
Let us assume that this efficiency parameter is given by  
 = ( )χ χ φ  
The higher values of  φ  imply lower efficiency of the bureaucrats in getting bribes.  
Under this rationale we then assume the following explicit functional form for the 
rents of the corrupt bureaucracy:  
  R yχψετ= ?  (80) 
where 1 reε = −? . This is the effective quotient for the tax burden, which includes the 
of the public sector including the bribes taken at the 
xation stage. Note, only if there is no bribes 
orne by the taxpayer and the revenue collected by the 
gov
bribes paid by the taxpayers.  
In other words, we are saying that the rents captured through extortions are 
proportional to the gross burden 
ta paid in taxation the gross public burden 
equals to the tax revenue collected by the government. With corruption there is always a 
wedge between the burden b
ernment.  
Equivalently, due to corrupt extortions the taxpayer departs with a part of after-tax 
income equal to R. That leaves him with the disposable income given by  
 (1 )dy y rey w Rττ τ= − + + −  
So we see that if we account for predation of the corrupt officials then after-tax income is 
lower than with tax evasion only. Recalling the expression (80) for R we can write:  
 (1 )dy y rey w yττ τ χψετ= − + + −  (81) 
Taking into account that 1 reε = −? and denoting  
 = (1+ )τ τ χψ?  (82) 
we re-write (81) as  
 (1 )dy re y wττ τ= − + +? ?  (83) 
The transition equation by analogy with the previous case is given by:  
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( )
2
 1([1 ]dk Ak gα α12
( )
)
r r k
k dt dW
gA k
α
τ ττ ρ
σ −
+? ?  (84) 
tes that the optimization problem has not changed mathematically as 
e transition equation is the same as in the basic mo
the excessive red 
tape, the income uncertainty still is generated by tax evasion only. Therefore, the 
ynamic characteristic of the model does not change. Then the po
determined analogously to the tax evasion case.  
 
−= − + − σ
This result indica
th del specified earlier. So that, when 
private agents are subject to deterministic income extortions through 
d licy functions are 
( )c t kρ=  (85) 
 2( )
r k
e t
y
τ
σ=
?
 (86) 
As the tax evasion process has not changed, the expected returns to tax evasion and 
its volatility has not changed too. However, = (1+ )>  τ τ χψ τ?  then from (86) we conclude 
at when the public sector is predatory the opti
The growth rate for this environment is obtained in a similar fashion to the tax 
vasion case and given by  
 
th mal tax evasion rate increases. 
e
( )1
2
2
[ ]
(1 )c
r
A A
αα
σ
τγ τ ψετ ρ−= − + −??  (87) 
Recall that 1g Ak gα αψετ −= , which yields us g A
k
ψετ⎛ ⎞⎟⎜ =⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ . Substituting
α
 it in (87), 
we
 
 obtain  
( )1
2
2
[ ]
(1 )c
r
A A
αα τγ τ ψετ σ
−= − + −?? ρ  (88) 
The growth rate in such an environment is lower than if there was tax evasion only. 
Firstly, the burden imposed by th
productive public input is offered due to greater tax evasion and the waste caused by red 
In a more general specification, we write the production fu
 
e public sector is heavier due to red tape. Secondly, less 
tape. 
nction as  
( , )y F k g=  
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If we adjust for the distortions caused by tax evasion and corruption, engendered red tape 
we obtain the following expression for the growth rate:  
 
21 [ ]
[(1 ) ( , ) ]
r
F k g
τγ τ ρ
2c kυ σ= − (89) + −
??  
where = yg ψετ? is the government input in the corrupt environment, ( , )kF k g?  is the 
marginal product of capital. 
( , )y F k g= ? , the growth We know that for a well-behaved production function 
optimization yields a unique value for the optimal tax rate al tax rate then 
g
. The optim
matched with the only optimal public input value for the given technology. The public 
input satisfies the condition 0 0g gψε= <?  as red tape and tax evasion strictly decrease 
the public input to private production. When τ τ<? , the growth rate given by (89) is 
suboptimal, as both the tax rate and the public input are inefficient in this case. If the 
effective burden is greater than the statutory burden >τ τ? , then private disposable income 
is lower. Therefore, the grow  a corrupt environment is again strictly lower 
than in the clean environment. Consequently, ither outcome with corruption the 
growth rate is suboptimal or  
 c
th rate in such
in e
γ γ>  (90) 
where γ  is the optimal growth rate in the clean environment, cγ  is the growth rate for the 
corrupt environment. The finding is summarised as follows: 
Proposition 2. In the environment with tax evasion, misuse of public funds, and extortion 
f private income by corrupt public officials, p
3.3  Excessive red tape and stochastic income extortion 
It is m ce with some probability. This 
o rivate disposable income is lower due to:  
• lower productivity caused by lower public input,  
• higher public burden caused by extortions.  
The lower disposable income leads to lower capital accumulation and that in turn - to 
lower growth.  
ore realistic to assume that the extortion takes pla
setting also allows us to see how an increase in income uncertainty affects growth. With 
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this additional assumption, disposable income is found as interaction of two stochastic 
, the corrupt public official by accepting bribes captures a rent equal to 
processes: 
1. tax evasion, 
2. and income extortion by corrupt officials.  
Suppose
R RR w= + . Here th? e first term is the deterministic part of the extorted rents and the 
sec t the expression for disposable income 
giv
 
ond term is its stochastic part. Then we adjus
en in (83) to  
(1 ) .d Ry re y w wττ τ= − + + +? ?  (91) 
The only difference form the previous case is that now we have a second stochastic 
term Rw  in the equation. From the tax evasion dynamics, we know that W( )w eyτ σ= . 
H ochastic term. In general, both ow , we do not know the form of the second st
stoc
ertainty from
ever
hastic process can be autonomous and may have different parameters. However, that 
makes our algebra unwieldy. It is reasonable to assume that the income unc  
both tax evasion and excessive red tape is correlated, as both depend on the quality of the 
same underlying institutions. In other words, we assume that ( )R Rw ey Wσ= . On this 
grounds we aggregate the stochastic processes and write  
 [( ) ] ( )R Rw w w ey W ey Wτ σ σ σ= + = + = ?  (92) 
Then we the policy functions and the transition functions ar similar to 
the deterministic income extortions case:  
e determined 
 (93) 
 
 ( )c t kρ=
2
( )
r k
e t
τ= ?  (94) 
yσ?
2
1
2
[ ]
(1 )
r k r k
k dt dW
τρ ⎤⎥− − ?  (95) dk Ak gα α ττ σ σ
−⎡⎢= − +⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
?? ? ?
The per capita growth rate is given by:  
 
( )1
2
2
[ ]
(1 ) (1 )cs
r
A A
αα τγ τ ζ ετ σ
−= − − + −?? ? ρ  (96)  
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As the uncertainty is higher in the stochastic extortion case than in th
extortion case, the expected return to tax evasion decreases. In other words, 
e deterministic 
σ σ>? , 
implies the following important result:  
 
2 2
2
[ ] [ ]r rτ τ
σ <
? ?
?  (97) 2σ
Therefore, in the economy with stochastic predation by bureaucrac
growth is lower than in the economy with stochastic tax evasion only. That is  
 
y and tax evasion, 
c csγ γ>  (98) 
where cγ  is the optimal growth rate for the case of deterministic extortions, csγ  is the 
tortions. Thus we conc
iciencies in the public sector, but also 
cor
 is now tilted towards the conclusion that corruption is not 
goo
An analysis of a simple stochastic model that captures the uncertainty in disposable 
x evasion demonstrates that when the tax rate is set to the optimal 
growth rate in the presence of stochastic ex lude that the higher 
corruption increases uncertainty of disposable income. The higher uncertainty then 
decreases capital accumulation, thus retarding the growth potential of the economy. This 
result is formulated as the following proposition: 
Proposition 3. An increase in corruption increases the uncertainty of disposable income, 
which in turn decreases capital accumulation.  
More generally, we can state that the adverse economic effect of corruption is not 
limited to the income redistribution and ineff
ruption affects the saving and investment decisions by increasing the uncertainty 
related to capital incomes.  
The ambiguous conclusion about the growth effects of corruption one may get based 
on the deterministic model
d for growth. Even if the heavy burden of the public sector is lowered by corruption, 
the uncertainty created by corrupt bureaucracy can counterbalance the gains. 
4  CONCLUSIONS 
income caused by ta
level, the extent of tax evasion should be zero for the socially optimal equilibrium. In the 
decentralized outcome, the equilibrium degree of tax evasion is greater than zero, which 
results in suboptimal amount of public input into private production. With the lower 
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public input the private productivity decreases, which leads to lower a private level of 
income. Thus, the tax evasion even in the absence of corruption exerts a negative effect 
on growth. 
The extensions to the basic model to incorporate corruption lead to the conclusions 
that corruption increases uncertainty faced by the private agents. Due to corruption, the 
exp
certainty increases with the increase 
in t
ies in the public sector, but also corruption affects the saving and investment 
dec
5.1  Derivation of the variance 
We denote the return on tax evasion by
ected burden of the public sector becomes heavier than the optimal burden in the 
absence of corruption. Therefore, it decreases the expected returns on private capital, 
which entails low capital accumulation and growth. 
By incorporating an additional uncertainty stemming from predation of the corrupt 
bureaucracy, we show that as a result the overall un
he extent of corruption. The solution of the model for this higher uncertainty setting 
yields a lower steady-state growth rate. Therefore, we conclude that corruption adversely 
affects growth by imposing a higher degree of uncertainty with respect to disposable 
incomes. 
The adverse economic effect of corruption is not limited to income redistribution and 
inefficienc
isions by increasing uncertainty related to capital incomes.  
5  APPENDIX 
x . The variance of the return on tax evasion is 
r. The first term is determined as 
2p s p p sτ τ τ= − + − = − − . Then 
2 2 2
2 2 2 2
var( ) [( ) ] ( [ ]) [1
)] [1 2 (1 ) (1 ) ]
[ ](1 ) (1 )( )
x E x E x
s p s p s
p p s p p
τ τ
τ θτ
= − = −
− − − + + +
= − + = −
 (100) 
then determined by  
 2 2( ) [ ) ] ( [ ])var x E x E x= −  (99) 
where E is the expectation operato
(
2 2 2 2[( ) ] ( ) (1 ) [1 (1 )]E x the variance of this random 
variable is given by  
 
2 2
2
(1 )] [(1 (1 )) ]
[1 (1
p s p s
pτ
− − − +
= −
2 2 2
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By denoting the variance of the return on tax evasion by 2σ  and obtain the following:  
22 2pqσ θ τ=  (101) 
5.2  Welfare optimization 
Assum
e economy populated with the identical ind
f the representative agent,  
e that government chooses tax rate so that the social welfare is maximized. Since, 
th ividuals, this problem reduces to the 
maximization of the utility o
 
0
max ( ) ( ) ( )U u c exp t dtτ τ ρ= −∫  (102) 
 
∞
( ) 0s.t. 1c k yr e kc kγ τ τ ρ⎡ ⎤= = = − + −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
??
,  (0)k k=  
Therefore, in time t capital per capita is given by  
 0( ) ( )k t k exp gt=  (103) 
Noting that ( ) ( )c t k tρ= from (33) (which is valid for CRTS functions) and 
sub ndividuals utility function in the 
llowing form:  
 
stituting for ( )k t we write the representative i
fo
0( ) ( ( )).u c ln k exp tρ γ=  (104) 
Then the optimization problem becomes  
 [ ]0
0
max ( ) ln( exp( )) exp( )U k tτ τ ρ γ ρ
∞
= −∫? t dt  (105) 
 ρ  (106) 
We note that the second term of (106) is not a function of tax rate. Therefore, this and 
oth gnored. In other words, 
This is simplified further as  
00 0
( ) ( ) ( )U t exp t dt ln k exp t dtγ ρ ρ∞ ∞= ⋅ − + −∫ ∫?
max ( )Uτ τ?er constant terms can be i  is equivalent to 
dtγ ρ∞= −∫ . This integration is solved as  0τ
 
max ( )Û texp t
0 02 20
1 1| |t t t ttte dt e e dt eρ ρ ρ ρ
0
1
ρ ρ ρ
∞ ∞− − ∞ − −= − + = −∫ ∫
6
ρ
∞=  
Then the first term of (10 ) becomes  
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2( )Û γ τρ=  (107) 
imization problem given by (105) is equivalent to 
maximization of the objective function given by (107). In other words, the welfare 
aximization is equivalent to maximization 
con
It is evident that the welfare max
m of the growth rate of the individual’s 
sumption. We summarise the results as Corollary 1.  
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